An evaluation of the contractionary devaluation hypothesis by Bebczuk, Ricardo Néstor et al.
 An Evaluation of the Contractionary Devaluation Hypothesis 
Ricardo Bebczuk, Arturo Galindo y Ugo Panizza 
Documento de Trabajo Nro. 64 
Septiembre 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar 
 
Inter-American Development Bank 
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) 
Research Department  
Departamento de Investigación 
Working Paper #582 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AN EVALUATION OF THE CONTRACTIONARY  
DEVALUATION HYPOTHESIS 
  
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
Ricardo Bebczuk* 
Arturo Galindo** 
Ugo Panizza*** 
 
 
 
*Universidad de La Plata 
**Universidad de los Andes 
***Inter-American Development Bank 
 
 
 
July 2006 
 
 
 
 2
Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the  
Inter-American Development Bank  
Felipe Herrera Library 
 
 
    
Bebczuk, Ricardo N. 
 
An evaluation of the contractionary devaluation hypothesis / by Ricardo Bebczuk, Arturo 
Galindo, Ugo Panizza. 
 
p. cm.  
(Research Department Working paper series ; 582) 
Includes bibliographical references. 
 
1. Devaluation of currency.    I. Galindo, Arturo J.  II. Panizza, Ugo.  III. Inter-American 
Development Bank. Research  Dept.   IV. Title.  V. Series. 
 
HG3852  .B32 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2006 
Inter-American Development Bank 
1300 New York Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20577 
 
The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be 
attributed to the Inter-American Development Bank, or to any individual acting on its behalf. 
 
This paper may be freely reproduced provided credit is given to the Research Department, Inter-
American Development Bank. 
 
The Research Department (RES) produces a quarterly newsletter, IDEA (Ideas for Development 
in the Americas), as well as working papers and books on diverse economic issues. To obtain a 
complete list of RES publications, and read or download them please visit our web site at: 
http://www.iadb.org/res. 
 
 3
Abstract∗ 
 
Recent empirical and theoretical literature on the impact of real exchange rate 
devaluations on economic performance questions the traditional expansionary 
effect generated within standard Mundell-Fleming models. Contractionary 
devaluations may arise when firms face maturity or currency mismatches that, 
when faced with real exchange rate depreciations, lead to balance-sheet effects 
that erode firms’ wealth and lead to an output contraction. While some authors 
show that the standard Mundell-Fleming result may hold even in the presence of 
currency mismatches, others point out that, if the balance sheet effect is large 
enough, devaluations can be contractionary. Using a large panel of 57 countries 
across the world and various newly constructed measures of dollarization, we test 
whether the balance sheet effect hypothesis has been relevant during the past 
decades in explaining economic downturns. Additionally, we explore the channels 
through which devaluations can be contractionary; in particular, we explore 
whether investment and consumption decisions are negatively affected by 
exchange rate devaluations under currency mismatches. 
 
Keywords: Currency depreciation; Debt composition; Balance sheet effects 
 
JEL: E0; F0; G32 
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1.  Introduction 
Throughout his sharp writings and lucid presentations on Latin American economies, Professor 
Werner Baer has shown a vivid interest on the exchange rate policy and its growth and welfare 
consequences. In particular, he has been consistently concerned about how macroeconomic 
strategies shape the income distribution and the level of unemployment in developing countries.1  
Part of the research on macroeconomic adjustment has focused on the role of exchange 
rates. As a key relative price in the economy, the real exchange rate may not only alter the 
country’s external balance but also other more socially sensitive variables such as income 
distribution, poverty, and employment. This explains the relentless effort on the part of scholars 
and policymakers to provide a reliable answer to whether real devaluations boost or hinder 
economic growth. A better understanding of this link would certainly have useful implications 
for the exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policies. This paper contributes to this debate by 
offering new empirical macro-level evidence on the impact of real exchange rate devaluations on 
growth for a large sample of countries during the1976-2003 period, using newly constructed 
measures of dollarization and various interaction effects. 
Table 1 summarizes the complex effects that real devaluations bring on economic 
activity. Let us consider the following flows across domestic sectors that include exportable and 
non-tradeable producers, as well as households – we rule out the government for simplicity (the 
effect, if any, would be similar to that on a non-tradeable producer) and the domestic financial 
sector by taking it as a mere intermediary between households and firms. It is expected that any 
decline in current and prospective cash flows for firms and households will translate into a 
decline of aggregate investment and consumption, respectively.  
                                                 
1 See, for example, Baer and Maloney (1997) or Amman and Baer (2003). 
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Table 1. Real Devaluation Effects on Sectoral Cash Flows 
 
Foreign currency- 
denominated variables 
Exportable 
producing firms 
Nontradeable 
producing firms 
Households 
Trade Channel 
Exportable Goods + - - 
Imported Goods - - - 
Financial Channel 
Gross Debt - - - 
Gross Assets + + + 
 
 
The traditional view posing that a real devaluation improves the trade balance emerges 
from the first two rows, which show that exportable producers are better off after the 
devaluation. Not only does the supply of exports increase but also a depressed aggregate demand 
for imports for consumption and investment purposes ensues and, as long as, the Marshall 
(1923)-Lerner (1944) conditions are satisfied, a real devaluation will have a positive effect on the 
trade balance. Subsequent developments such as the popular Mundell (1963)-Fleming (1962) 
model adopted this approach, implying that devaluations are expansionary. Of course, as shown 
in the first two columns of the upper panel in Table 1, this model assumes that the beneficial 
revenue effect for tradeable producing industries outweighs the detrimental one for nontradeable 
producers and the negative impact on the tradeable sector that arises from the more expensive 
imported inputs. 
An income effect adds to the previous substitution effect: as far as nominal wages do not 
fully adjust to the new price level, household disposable income is negatively affected, with a 
deleterious impact on aggregate consumption coming from the inflation in the tradeable 
consumption basket.2 Diaz-Alejandro (1965) and Krugman and Taylor (1978) give theoretical 
support to this early contractionary devaluation mechanism brought about by income distribution 
                                                 
2 It must be noted that while the price of tradeables normally keeps track of the exchange rate in an open economy, 
non-tradeables might also do so in dollar-indexed economies.  
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considerations. Lizondo and Montiel (1988) and Larrain and Sachs (1986) are in-depth 
explorations within this framework.  
Modern contributions have placed more emphasis on a financial channel rather than on 
the standard trade channel. In light of the dollarization process taking place in a number of 
emerging economies over the last decades, this research stresses the mismatch between foreign 
currency denominated debt and domestic currency denominated revenues (see, among others, 
Krugman (1999), Céspedes et al. (2004), and Frankel (2005)). Going back to Table 1, this is 
reflected in the first line of the lower panel. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that the sign 
and magnitude of the effect is linked to the net, as opposed to the gross, foreign denominated 
debt. Looking at the second row of the lower panel, gross assets might be owned by firms and 
households in countries having suffered massive capital flights in the past. Moreover, when it 
comes to domestic dollarization, it is clear that dollar denominated debts are partly financed with 
dollar denominated instruments.   
The rest of the paper reviews the related empirical evidence (Section 2) and discusses our 
findings (Section 3). Some conclusions close. 
 
2. Empirical Literature Review 
 
The critical role of the exchange rate in the economy, especially during currency and financial 
crises, has stimulated a substantial empirical research effort. We start with some macro-level 
evidence. Edwards (1986) finds a moderate short-run effect and no long-run effect of exchange 
rate depreciations on GDP level and growth for a panel of 12 developing countries. Kamin and 
Klau (1998) find similar results for a sample of 27 developing and industrialized countries. More 
recent contributions focus on financial factors arising from currency mismatches that turn real 
devaluations contractionary. These papers argue that balance sheet effects are the cause of the 
contractionary effect of devaluations in emerging countries since the 1990s.3 In short, a 
depreciation in the real exchange rate, increases the value of financial obligations in foreign 
currency vis-à-vis the value of revenues in domestic currency, causing liquidity and solvency 
problems that hinder growth possibilities for firms. 
Regarding country case studies, Amman and Baer (2003) contend that Brazil’s devaluation in 
1999 had a positive growth effect, as some analysts claim in regard to the post-2001 crisis 
                                                 
3 See Galindo, Panizza and Schiantarelli (2003) for an empirical survey. 
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Argentine experience. In contrast Bonomo et al. (2003) find that in firms with high liability 
dollarization those results are reversed. Domac (1997) reaches the same conclusion looking at 
the Turkish economy over 1960-1990.   
Recently, many empirical studies resort to micro-level data to assess the impact of real 
exchange rate depreciations in the presence of currency mismatches. These studies have 
analyzed the impact of real exchange rate fluctuations on the dynamics of investment and 
employment. Bleakley and Cowan (2002) use a sample or 480 firms from five Latin American 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico) during 1991-1999, to test if real 
exchange rate devaluations have influenced investment decisions. They do not find conclusive 
evidence regarding a contractionary effect of exchange rate depreciations on investment.  
Further country specific work summarized by Galindo et al. (2003) find different results. 
In a study of Mexican firms, Pratap et al. (2003) find that exchange rate depreciations have a 
negative effect on firm performance, measured using the investment rate. This result confirms 
previous research on Mexico by Aguiar (2005) and Martinez and Werner (2002).  Carranza et al. 
(2003), Galiani et al. (2003), Echeverry et al (2003), and Benavente et al (2003) find similar 
results for Peru, Argentina, Colombia and Chile, respectively.4  
In a study analyzing the effect of real exchange rate depreciations on employment in the 
presence of liability dollarization, Galindo, Izquierdo and Montero (2005) use a panel dataset on 
industrial employment and trade for 9 Latin American countries, and find that real exchange rate 
depreciations impact employment growth positively in countries with high trade openness, but 
this effect is reversed as liability dollarization increases. In industries with high liability 
dollarization, the overall impact of real exchange rate depreciations is negative. 
 
3. Empirical Methods and Results 
 
Building on a standard growth regression, and in light of recent firm-level evidence and the 
cumbersome relationship between devaluations and growth, we incorporate interaction terms to 
evaluate the contractionary devaluation hypothesis in a cross-country econometric framework. 
We test whether the presence of dollar denominated debt is important for the effect of real 
depreciations on GDP growth estimating the following model:5 
 
                                                 
4 Harvey and Roper (1999) find that balance sheet effects played a significant role in propagating the crisis. 
5 We use dollar debt and dollarization as a shortcut for foreign currency debt.  
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where the dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita measured in PPP dollars (we 
use PPP dollars in order to avoid an automatic relationship between GDP growth and changes in 
the real exchange rate), X is a matrix of country-specific time-invariant characteristics (which we 
will later substitute with country fixed effects), Z is a matrix of country-specific time-variant 
characteristics,6 DRER is the percentage change in the real exchange rate (we use the bilateral 
real exchange rate with respect to the US dollar, with a positive sign indicating a depreciation), 
and DOLL is a measure of dollarization to be precisely defined momentarily. Our coefficients of 
interest are γ and φ. As the standard Mundell-Fleming model assumes that devaluations are 
expansionary, we expect γ to be positive, but the balance sheet effect literature suggest that the 
expansionary effect of devaluations should be smaller in countries with high levels of 
dollarization and hence we expect φ to be negative.  
We use three measures of dollarization: external dollarization, and two alternative 
measures of domestic dollarization. We define external dollarization as follows:   
 
External Dollarization =OSIN*External Debt /GDP 
 
where OSIN is the Original Sin measure built by Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2005), 
which measures the currency composition of external debt (we use their OSIN3 index, where 1 
corresponds to a fully dollarized external debt) and EXTERNAL DEBT/GDP is the country’s 
total external debt measured as a share of GDP.  As OSIN has limited over time variability, all 
the overtime variability of External Dollarization comes from External Debt/GDP.  External 
Dollarization takes high values for countries which have high levels of external debt and for 
which there is no international market for local currency debt (for instance, Argentina) and has 
low values for countries that have low levels of external debt (such as Guatemala) and hence 
have low value of external debt or countries (such as South Africa) for which there is a 
substantial market of domestic currency international debt and hence have low values of OSIN. 
Note that we obtain our external debt data from the World Bank’s Global Development 
Finance (GDF) database. As GDF does not report data for industrial countries, we assume that 
                                                 
6 We use the same set of country characteristics used by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002): Investment over 
GDP, Population and Population Growth, Secondary Enrollment, lagged Government Consumption, Civil Liberties, 
change in Terms of Trade, the Frankel and Romer index of openness, and three regional dummies. 
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these countries have zero external debt and, hence, we implicitly assume that they do not have 
external dollarization. In the robustness analysis, we will explore the consequences of this 
assumption.  
 We define domestic dollarization 1 as the share of dollar bank deposits of GDP. 
Formally: 
 
Domestic dollarization1 =Deposit Dollarization*(Bank Deposits/GDP). 
 
We obtain data on deposit dollarization from the database assembled by Levy-Yeyati (2006). In 
order to expand our number of observations, we assume that domestic dollarization is constant 
within countries.7 
 Our second measure of domestic dollarization (Domestic Dollarization 2)) is what Calvo 
et al. (2005) call Domestic Liability Dollarization (DLD), this measure is similar to the previous 
one but rather than focusing on the structure of bank liabilities (i.e., deposits), it focuses on the 
structure of bank assets (i.e. loans).  In particular, Calvo et al. (2005) build the domestic 
dollarization measure as follows. For industrial economies they use BIS reporting banks’ local 
asset positions in foreign currency as a share of GDP. For emerging economies, they add dollar 
deposits and bank foreign borrowing (IFS line 26c) and then assume that banks match their 
liabilities with their assets: 
 
Domestic Dollarization2 =Loan Dollarization*(Bank Loans/GDP). 
 
 We estimate the model using an unbalanced panel of 57 countries (22 industrial and 35 
developing) over the 1976-2003 period. Column 1 of Table 2 reports our baseline regression for 
external dollarization (we estimate the equation using a random effects model). As expected, we 
find that real depreciations are associated with higher growth. The effect is economically 
significant as the point estimates suggest that, in countries with no external dollarization, a 20 
percent real devaluation is associated with an increase in per capita GDP growth of 
approximately half a percentage point. We also find that external dollarization does reduce the 
expansionary effect of devaluations. In particular, the point estimates suggest that in countries 
where external dollarization is greater than 0.84 (countries that have dollar denominated external 
debt greater than 84 percent of GDP), currency devaluations become contractionary. This 
                                                 
7 Our results do not change if we relax this assumption. 
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corresponds to the top decile of the distribution of observations in the whole sample and to the 
top 20 if we restrict the sample to developing countries. 
 Column 2 repeats the experiment by focusing on domestic dollarization (again we use 
random effects). In this case, we still find that the coefficients have the right sign but they are not 
statistically significant. This is consistent with the fact, underlined in Section 1, that domestic 
dollar debts are partially held by residents, particularly depositors, so the aggregate effect of a 
real exchange rate devaluation is unclear.  
Column 3 uses the measure of domestic liability dollarization assembled by Calvo et al. 
(2005). This reduces the sample to 29 countries (18 industrial and 11 developing), but we still 
find a large negative effect of depreciations in countries with high levels of domestic liability 
dollarization.  In particular, the point estimates indicate that the effect of depreciations gets 
negative for countries with values of domestic liability dollarization higher than 0.5, which is just 
above the median value for DLD in our sample.  
In column 4, we repeat the experiment of Column 1, but substituting the time invariant 
country-specific variable with a set of country fixed effects, with results remaining mostly 
unchanged. This is done in order to control for a variety of country specific effects that might 
have been ignored in the empirical specification. We still find that devaluations are expansionary 
in countries with low levels of external dollarization and contractionary in countries with high 
levels of external dollarization. Column 5 repeats the experiment of column 2 using fixed effects, 
but even though the coefficients have the correct sign, they are not statistically significant. 
Column 6 repeats the experiment of column 3 using fixed effects without finding major changes. 
In all cases, we include an interaction term of real depreciation with the trade openness 
coefficient under the hypothesis that the former will have more powerful effects in more open 
economies, and this is confirmed in columns 3 and 6. 
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In Table 3 we explore the consequences of our assumption that industrial countries have 
no external dollarization (without reporting, from now on, the whole control set and focusing on 
external dollarization and the only significant domestic dollarization measure –Domestic 
dollarization2). We do this in two ways. In columns 1 and 2 we interact real depreciation with a 
dummy variable that takes value one for industrial countries (column 1 uses random effects and 
column 2 uses fixed effects).8 This should allow us to separate the effect of dollarization from 
that of being an industrial country. We find that this interaction has a negative and not significant 
                                                 
8 The regressions include the same set of controls as in Table 1, but in order to save space we only report the 
variables of interest.  
Table 2: Base Line Regressions
Dependent Variable: GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gross Fixed Capital Formation / GDP 0.168 0.189 0.205 0.195 0.191 0.333
[0.021]*** [0.028]*** [0.040]*** [0.028]*** [0.034]*** [0.077]***
Population Growth -0.002 0.002 -0.005 0.000 0.004 -0.009
[0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002]* [0.008]
Log(GDP Per Capita 1974) -0.008 -0.008 -0.005
[0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]
Secondary Schooling / Total Population 0.010 0.022 0.019 -0.011 -0.005 0.049
[0.010] [0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.019] [0.065]
Log(Population) 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.007 -0.004 0.035
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.010] [0.010] [0.066]
Government Consumption Growth 0.025 0.031 0.033 0.020 0.025 0.009
[0.013]* [0.013]** [0.021] [0.014] [0.014]* [0.023]
Freedom Index -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.002
[0.001]** [0.002]** [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005]
Δ Terms of Trade 0.007 -0.011 0.058 0.010 -0.010 0.058
[0.014] [0.013] [0.045] [0.014] [0.012] [0.045]
Δ Real Exchange Rate 0.028 0.007 -0.021 0.029 0.002 -0.016
[0.016]* [0.015] [0.018] [0.016]* [0.015] [0.020]
Openness 0.028 0.026 -0.022 0.036 0.026 0.010
[0.009]*** [0.010]** [0.017] [0.013]*** [0.013]** [0.030]
Δ Real Exchange Rate * Openness -0.033 -0.039 0.514 -0.031 -0.016 0.440
[0.060] [0.082] [0.140]*** [0.060] [0.087] [0.134]***
External Dollarization [t-1] -0.009 -0.007
[0.004]** [0.005]
Δ Real Exchange Rate * External Dollarization [t-1] -0.028 -0.031
[0.013]** [0.014]**
Domestic Dollarization [t-1] 0.0000
[0.000]
Δ Real Exchange Rate * Domestic Dollarization [t-1] 0.0000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001]
Domestic Dollarization 2 [t-1] -0.030 -0.061
[0.030] [0.047]
Δ Real Exchange Rate * Domestic Dollarization 2 [t-1] -0.504 -0.477
[0.060]*** [0.056]***
SAFRICA Dummy -0.014 -0.018
[0.007]* [0.007]***
LATAM Dummy -0.003 -0.006 0.003
[0.004] [0.004] [0.007]
ECA Dummy -0.005 0.000 0.003
[0.009] [0.009] [0.016]
Observations 1416 1324 289 1416 1324 289
Number of Countries 57 56 29 57 56 29
Estimation Method
Random 
Effects
Random 
Effects
Random 
Effects Fixed Effects
Fixed 
Effects
Fixed 
Effects
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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coefficient,9 but what is more interesting for our purposes is that the coefficients of γ and φ are 
unchanged (if anything φ increases in absolute value). Our second strategy consists of dropping 
all industrial countries from the sample (columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 use random and fixed 
effects, respectively): once more the results are unchanged. Table 3B repeats the experiment 
using domestic dollarization, and again we find that the results are robust to dropping industrial 
countries. Notice that the domestic dollarization measure correctly captures the possibility of 
liability dollarization in industrial countries and in this case we observe that the drer*IND 
interaction has the expected positive sign.  
 
                                                 
9 While the negative coefficient may seem puzzling, this can be easily rationalized with the observation that we are 
forcing all industrial countries to have zero dollarization but some balance sheet effect are likely to be at work there 
and we would capture them if we could measure external dollarization in these countries. Since we cannot measure 
these effect the DRER*IND interaction just capture their average effect.   
Table 3: Separating the Effect of Industrial Countries (Using External Liability Dollarization)
Dependent Variable: GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ Real Exchange Rate [t-1] 0.031 0.03 0.037 0.032
[0.017]* [0.018]* [0.021]* [0.021]
Openness 0.031 0.035 0.041 0.047
[0.009]*** [0.013]*** [0.016]*** [0.025]*
Δ Real Exchange Rate * Openness -0.032 -0.028 -0.07 -0.046
[0.060] [0.060] [0.087] [0.086]
External Dollarization [t-1] -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.006
[0.004]** [0.005] [0.004]** [0.005]
Δ Real Exchange Rate * External Dollarization [t-1] -0.03 -0.032 -0.03 -0.032
[0.015]** [0.016]** [0.015]** [0.016]**
Industrial Countries 0.013
[0.009]
Δ Real Exchange Rate * Industrial Countries -0.008 -0.005
[0.016] [0.016]
Observations 1416 1416 828 828
Number of Countries 57 57 35 35
Estimation Method Random Effects
Fixed 
Effects
Random 
Effects Fixed Effects
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: The regressions include the same controls as in table 1, but are not reported in order to save 
space. Detailed results are available upon request.
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Next, we explore the role of outliers. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, we estimate the 
model for our external dollarization measure (again using random and fixed effects) after 
dropping all observations where εσε 3, ≥ti .10 Again, we find that the coefficients are unchanged.  
Finally, we use the robust regression routine of STATA (this is the RREG command which uses 
two types of iterations to put less weight on outliers). In column 3 we run regular robust 
regression and in column 4 we also include a set of country fixed effects. The results are 
basically identical to those of our baseline regression. Table 4B repeats the experiment for 
domestic liability dollarization and again confirms the result. 
                                                 
10 We proceed in two steps: estimate the model, recover the residual, compute their variance, and then re-estimate 
the model dropping all observations fro which the above condition holds.  
Table 3b: Separating the Effect of Industrial Countries (Using Domestic Liability Dollarization 2)
Dependent Variable: GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ Real Exchange Rate [t-1] -0.021 -0.015 -0.037 -0.018
[0.018] [0.018] [0.036] [0.044]
Openness -0.02 0.047 -0.057 0.073
[0.018] [0.038] [0.155] [0.197]
Δ Real Exchange Rate * Openness 0.479 0.207 0.777 0.259
[0.160]*** [0.174] [0.623] [0.817]
Domestic Dollarization 2 [t-1] -0.024 -0.056 0.021 0.035
[0.031] [0.047] [0.047] [0.065]
Δ Real Exchange Rate * Domestic Dollarization 2 [t-1] -0.506 -0.485 -0.522 -0.543
[0.061]*** [0.056]*** [0.067]*** [0.072]***
Industrial Countries 0.004
[0.017]
Δ Real Exchange Rate * Industrial Countries 0.012 0.06
[0.026] [0.032]*
Observations 289 289 112 112
Number of Countries 29 29 11 11
Estimation Method
Random 
Effects
Fixed 
Effects
Random 
Effects Fixed Effects
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: The regressions include the same controls as in table 1, but are not reported in order to save space. 
Detailed results are available upon request.
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After having established that our baseline result is extremely robust, we now move to test 
whether the effect documented above goes through investment or consumption growth.  In Table 
5, we run a set of regression similar to those of Table 1 but with the growth rate of investment as 
the dependent variable. In columns 1 and 2, we carry out the regressions for external 
Table 4: The Role of Outliers  (Using External Liability Dollarization)
Dependent Variable: GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ Real Exchange Rate [t-1] 0.031 0.028 0.029 0.033
[0.013]** [0.013]** [0.011]*** [0.011]***
Openness 0.027 0.043 0.019 0.046
[0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.007]*** [0.012]***
Δ Real Exchange Rate * Openness -0.051 -0.043 -0.054 -0.063
[0.055] [0.055] [0.048] [0.047]
External Dollarization [t-1] -0.011 -0.01 -0.012 -0.011
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Δ Real Exchange Rate * External Dollarization [t-1] -0.026 -0.029 -0.024 -0.029
[0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]***
Observations 1390 1388 1416 1416
Number of Countries 57 57 57 57
Estimation Method Random Effects
Fixed 
Effects
Robust 
Regression
Robust 
Regression 
with Fixed 
Effects
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: The regressions include the same controls as in table 1, but are not reported in order to save space. 
Detailed results are available upon request.
Table 4b: The Role of Outliers  (Using Domestic Liability Dollarization 2)
Dependent Variable: GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ Real Exchange Rate [t-1] -0.025 -0.013 -0.026 -0.022
[0.018] [0.020] [0.018] [0.016]
Openness -0.024 0.009 -0.025 0.011
[0.017] [0.030] [0.021] [0.029]
Δ Real Exchange Rate * Openness 0.52 0.386 0.505 0.369
[0.138]*** [0.126]*** [0.148]*** [0.129]***
Domestic Dollarization 2 [t-1] -0.032 -0.056 -0.037 -0.017
[0.029] [0.042] [0.022] [0.030]
Δ Real Exchange Rate * Domestic Dollarization [t-1] -0.499 -0.493 -0.477 -0.433
[0.059]*** [0.054]*** [0.065]*** [0.056]***
Observations 288 284 289 288
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29
Estimation Method Random Effects
Fixed 
Effects
Robust 
Regression
Robust 
Regression 
with Fixed 
Effects
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: The regressions include the same controls as in table 1, but are not reported in order to save space. 
Detailed results are available upon request.
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dollarization (with random and fixed effects, respectively) concluding that the balance sheet 
effect is very strong. The effect of domestic dollarization is tested in columns 3 and 4, and the 
estimate turns out to be highly positive and significant at a 10-percent level. To save space, we 
do not present the consumption growth regressions (which are available upon request), but they 
decisively reject the presence of an effect as the one detected for GDP and investment growth.  
 
Table 5: Investment Growth
Dependent Variable: Growth of Investment in PPP Dollars
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population Growth 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.005
[0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.006]
Log(GDP Per Capita 1974) -0.002 0.000
[0.001]** [0.002]
Secondary Schooling / Total Population 0.001 -0.016 0.001 0.029
[0.007] [0.013] [0.011] [0.036]
Log(Population) 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.013
[0.000]* [0.006] [0.001] [0.047]
Government Consumption Growth 0.023 0.021 0.000 -0.001
[0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.014] [0.016]
Freedom Index -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.003
[0.001]** [0.001]* [0.002] [0.003]
Δ Terms of Trade -0.033 -0.032 -0.012 -0.008
[0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.027] [0.028]
Δ Real Exchange Rate -0.001 -0.002 -0.023 -0.026
[0.009] [0.009] [0.019] [0.020]
Openness 0.011 0.018 -0.004 -0.013
[0.005]** [0.007]** [0.011] [0.018]
Δ Real Exchange Rate * Openness 0.037 0.039 0.159 0.159
[0.039] [0.042] [0.098] [0.099]
External Dollarization [t-1] 0.001 -0.001
[0.001] [0.002]
Δ Real Exchange Rate * External Dollarization [t-1] -0.026 -0.025
[0.004]*** [0.004]***
Domestic Dollarization [t-1] -0.058 -0.101
[0.020]*** [0.038]***
Δ Real Exchange Rate * Domestic Dollarization [t-1] -0.149 -0.134
[0.084]* [0.080]*
SAFRICA Dummy 0.001
[0.004]
LATAM Dummy 0.001 -0.002
[0.002] [0.004]
ECA Dummy -0.002 -0.002
[0.003] [0.007]
Observations 1415 1415 289 289
Number of Countries 57 57 29 29
Estimation Method
Random 
Effects Fixed Effects
Random 
Effects Fixed Effects
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we explore the role of liability dollarization on the way that real exchange rate 
devaluations impact economic growth. Our research follows recent research pieces that have 
shown that at a microeconomic level balance sheet effects arise in the presence of liability 
dollarization and leads to negative impacts of real exchange rate devaluations on firm 
performance. Our research complements the microeconomic research by showing how at a 
macro level the results hold and are economically significant. 
We find that in countries with no external dollarization, a 20 percent real devaluation 
increases per capita GDP growth in approximately half a percentage point. As dollarization 
increases, the expansionary effect of devaluations diminishes. In countries where the external 
dollarization measure used in the text is greater than 0.84 (countries that have dollar 
denominated external debt greater than 84 percent of GDP), currency devaluations become 
contractionary. This corresponds to the top decile of the distribution of observations in the whole 
sample and to the top 20 if we restrict the sample to developing countries. 
Similar results are obtained when using a measure of domestic liability dollarization. In 
short, for most of the developing country sample, the contractionary effect of devaluations seems 
to dominate the expansionary effect that is brought in though the standard trade channels of the 
Mundell-Fleming model. These results are robust to several specification changes, including 
separating the effect of industrial and developing countries, and dealing explicitly with possible 
outliers.  
Our study also confirms that investment is the main channel through which the 
macroeconomic adjustment is achieved following a real exchange rate devaluation. 
Microeconomic research had shown that firms with dollarized liabilities adjust capital 
expenditure negatively when faced with devaluations while other firms respond positively. This 
paper shows that at the macro level the adjustment also comes through investment rather than 
consumption.  
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